PHILOSOPHY OF MIND HSE Department of Philosophy January-March, 2011 Gasparyan Diana Oxford philosophers are joking: - What is Mind? - No matter. - What is Matter? - Never mind
Course Guide This Course is built as a conceptual one. Its structure is the following: 1. We put problem (s); 2. We give (all) possible solutionsapproaches-theories; 3. We consider those main arguments. 4. We mention the most significant names if it needed. Sociology of PM in the US
Philosophy of Mind PM Metaphysics MP Philosophy of Language PL 80 70 60 50
40 30 20 10 0 PM MP PL 19401960 19802005
Sociology of PM in Europe Philosophy of Mind PM Philosophy of Politics PP AntiMetaphisics AM
70 60 50 40 PM PP AM 30 20 10
0 1940- 1960- 19801960 1980 2005 Sociology of PM in Russia Philosophy of Mind PM Dialectical Materialism
Philosophy of Language 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
PM DM PL 1940- 1960- 19801960 1980 2005 Philosophy in general 90 80 70 60 50
40 30 20 10 0 GERMANY FRANCE BRITAIN US 19001930 19301960
19601990 19902010 What does PM mean? No (pure) phenomenology. Wrong we have to speak about consciousness within consciousness. Correct we have to speak about consciousness in outer (scientific) way. No (pure) transcendentalism. Wrong Rational Psychology was destroyed by I. Kant, so its no way to restore it.
Correct who said that he was right? No (pure) classical approaches. Wrong Philosophys already discovered all possible solutions. Correct we cant automatically trust to classic philosophers; there is a lot of work to do; PM includes mostly the following problems: MIND-BODY PROBLEM; PROBLEM OF FREE WILL;
WHAT CONCHIOUSNESS (MIND) IS?; HOW DOES CONCHIOUSNESS (MIND) WORK? In some respect we can assume that three last problems are essential part of the first one. CONCIOUSNESS VS. MIND MIND is more psychological notion in cognitive or neuroscientific meaning; It refers to processes of thinking, processes which are running in brain and so on;
CONCIOUSNESS is more phenomenological notion; It supposes specific mental reality which presumably differs from physical reality. Easy and Hard problems of PM How could a physical system be the sort of thing that could learn, or that could remember (D. Chalmers) EASY PROBLEM
How could a physical system be the sort of thing that could experience pain? (D. Chalmers) HARD PROBLEM Names and Trends Most influential names and strategies in PM today are: 1. Daniel Dennett Reductive Physicalism (Functionalism); 2. John Searle Emergentism (AntiFunctionalism);
3. David Chalmers Natural Dualism; 4. Mc.Ginn, St. Pinker (partially) Sceptical point of view; 5. Noam Chomsky MBP is a pseudo problem (philosophy of language technique) Terminological clarities Properties, Events, Processes, Qualia,
Propositional states: beliefs and desires. MIND BODY PROBLEM 1. Generally Speaking PM covers two main problems: What is mind? and
2. How is it connected with matter, namely a brain? Answers Generally speaking there two possible answers to these questions: 1. On the one hand, we can assert that the mind it something material; therefore Mind is just a part of body. 2. On the other hand, its possible to state
that Mind is not a material or physical one; therefore, its somehow connected with a body, but not reduced to it. The main argument of the first point of view is the following Its pretty obvious and evident that Mind is related to the brain and physical processes in the brain. For instance, some brain traumas might cause changes in mental states. Moreover, when we affect on the brain (particular parts of brain) some specific mental states can be caused as hallucinations or uncommon sensual
states. In these cases, a brain can be considered as a material part of a material body. Consequently the mind is a material entity. A central argument of the second point of view claims that Its impossible to observe our thought as a physical phenomenon and, that there is no an access to our mental life, which is consists of private non-observed experience. For example, when we conceive a yellow lemon or a pink elephant it doesnt mean that someone can find
them in my brain. The lemon and the elephant as my mental images are nonphysical objects. Therefore mind is not a material entity. Very roughly speaking slide 1. According to these two approaches, we can distinguish two main theories in PM. The first theory, which is named physicalism, insists on a physical nature of the mind. Philosophers who support this theory try to prove that mental states and physical states are the same, but because of
number of errors (for example of language), we face the delusion that there are two realities physical and mental. Very roughly speaking slide 2. The second theory, which is named dualism, rejects a physical nature of the mind and states that mental states are nonphysical. That means that these states are supposed to be independent and non-reducible to the physical processes. If so we have to admit two separate realities physical and mental
(nonphysical) and try to find out how they are connected and interacted. Making PM more narrow However in modern PM this problem mostly put in it Cartesian version, namely, how (Body) Brain is connected with Mind and vice versa. Main philosophical difficulties here are the following:
In terms of common sense we think that Body and its reactions are something physical, meanwhile Mind and its processes are non-physical. Therefore its not quite clear how they can interact, cause they are different as properties; In terms of common sense, scientific and philosophical points of view there is only one non-contradictive way to describe causality of the world physical events causes only physical events, which means consequent process (no ontological gaps). 1. 2.
Is There a Mark of the Mental? Whats the ontological status of Mentality is it Factual Truth or Deducible Truth? The way of giving an answer on this question will determine the epistemological status of our theory. Criteria of having Mind (Consciousness): Slide 1.
1. 2. 3. Epistemological Criteria You are experiencing a sharp toothache caused by an exposed nerve in a molar. The toothache that you experience, but not the condition of your molar, is a mental occurrence. But what is the basis of this distinction? One influential answer says that the distinction consists in certain fundamental differences in the way you come to have knowledge of the three phenomena: Direct or Immediate Knowledge:
Your knowledge that you have a toothache, or that you are hoping for rain tomorrow, is direct or immediate; it is not based on evidence or Inference; Privacy or First-Person Privilege: One possible response to the foregoing challenge is to invoke the privacy of our knowledge of our own mental states, namely, the apparent fact that this direct access to a mental event is enjoyed by a single subject, the person to whom the event is occurring; Infallibility or Transparency (Self-Intimacy): Another epistemic feature sometimes associated with mentality is the idea in some sense your knowledge of your own current mental states is infallible or incorrigible, or that is self-intimating (or that your mind is transparent to you). Criteria of having Mind (Consciousness):
Slide 2. Ontological criteria: 1. Nonspatial Criterion of Mentality: For Descartes, the essential nature of a mind is that it is a thinking thing, and the essential nature of a material thing is that it is a spatially extended thing. A corollary of this, for Descartes, is that the mental is essentially nonspatial and the material is essentially lacking in the capacity for thinking. Most physicalists would reject this corollary even if they accept the thesis that the mental in definable as thinking.
2. Intentionality as a Criterion of the Mental: Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Sholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional reference to a content, direction toward an object, or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgment something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on. Making Sense of Mind-Brain Correlations slide 1
ausal Interactionism. Descartes thought that causal interaction between the mind and the body occurred in the pineal gland. He speculated that animal spirits - fluids made up of extremely fine particles flowing around the pineal gland cause it to move in various ways, and these motions of the gland in turn cause conscious states of the mind. Preestablished Harmony Between Mind and Body. Leibniz, like many of his contemporaries, thought that no coherent sense could be made of Descartes, idea that an immaterial mind, which is not even in physical space, could causally interact with a material
body like the pineal gland, managing to move this not-so-insignificant lump of tissue hither and thither. Occasionalism. According to Malebranche, another great continental rationalist, whenever a mental event appears to cause a physical event or a physical event appears to cause a mental event, it is only an illusion. Making Sense of Mind-Brain Correlations slide 2
The Double Aspect Theory (Neutral monism). Spinoza (Russel) claimed that mind and body are simply two correlated aspects of a single underlying substance that is in itself neither mental nor material. Epiphenomenalism. According to T. Huxley, every mental event is caused by a physical event in the brain, but mental event have no causal power of their own, being the absolute terminal links of causal chains. Emergentism. This position holds that when biological processes attain a certain level of organizational complexity, a wholly new type of phenomenon, namely, concsiousness, emerges and these emergent phenomena are not explainable in terms of the lower-level physicalbiological phenomena.
The Psychoneural (or Psychophysical, Mind-Body) Identity Theory. This position, formulated and explicity advanced as a solution to the mindbody problem in the late 1950s, advocates the identification of mental states and events with the physical processes in the brain. Types of Causation DUALISM Two types of Dualism: Substance Property Dualism;
Dualism or nonreductive Physicalism. Substance Dualism. Cartesian Dualism 4 main thesis of Descartes dualism: 1. There substances of two fundamentally different kinds in the world, mind and bodies. The essential nature of a body is to be extended in space; the essence of a mind is to think and engage in other mental activities. 2. A human person is a composite being (union, as Descartes called it) of a mind and a body; 3. Minds are diverse from bodies; 4. Minds and bodies causally influence each other. Some mental
phenomena are causes of physical phenomena and vice versa. Arguments for the Thesis that Minds and Bodies are Distinct Argument 1 I am such that my existence cannot be doubted; My body is not such that its existence cannot be doubted; Therefore, I am not identical with my body; Therefore, the thinking thing that I am is not identical with my body.
Argument 2 My mind is transparent to me - that is, nothing can be in my mind without my knowing that it is there; My body is not transparent to me in the same; Therefore, my mind is not identical with my body. Argument 3
Each mind is such that there is a unique subject who has direct and privileged access to contents; No material body has a specially privileged knower-knowledge of material things is in principle public and intersubjective; Therefore, minds are not identical with material bodies. Argument 4 My essential nature is to be a thinking thing;
My body, essential nature is to be an extended thing in space; Therefore, I am not identical with my body. And since I am a thinking thing (namely a mind), my mind is not identical with my body. Argument 5 If anything is material, it is essentially material; However, I am possibly immaterial-that is,
there is a world in which I exist without a body; Hence, I am not essentially material; Hence, it follows (with the first premise) that I am not material. Argument 6
Suppose I am identical with this body of mine; In 1995 I existed; In 1995 this body did not exist; Hence, from the first premise, it follows that I did not exist in 1995;. But this contradicts the second premise, and the supposition is false; Hence, I am not identical with my body. Argument 7
Suppose I am identical with this body of mine; Then, by (NI), I am necessarily identical with this body-that is, I am identical with it in every possible world; But that is false, for (a) in some possible worlds I could be disembodied and have no body, or at least
(b) I could have a different body in another possible world. Therefore I am not identical with my body. Substance dualism. Thought Experiment David Chalmers recently developed a thought experiment inspired by the movie The Matrix in which substance dualism could be true: Consider a computer simulation in which the bodies of the creatures are controlled by their minds and the minds remain strictly external to the simulation. The creatures can do all the science they want in the world, but they will never be able to
figure out where their minds are, for they do not exist in their observable universe. This is a case of substance dualism with respect to computer simulation. This naturally differs from a computer simulation in which the minds are part of the simulation. In such a case, substance monism would be true. Arguments against dualism Drawing from Ren Descartes' (1596-1650) in "meditations mtaphysiques" explaining the function of the pineal gland. Pineal gland is a part of body,
therefore its an physical entity. That means that physical and nonphysical are intersected. HOW IT COULD BE POSSIBLE?? Counterargument 1. Argument from causal interaction. One argument against Dualism is with regards to causal interaction. Dualism must explain how consciousness affects physical reality. One of the main objections to dualistic interactionism is lack of explanation of how the material and immaterial are able to interact. Varieties of dualism according to which an immaterial mind causally affects the material body
and vice-versa have come under tough attack from different quarters, especially in the 20th century. Critics of dualism have often asked how something totally immaterial can affect something totally material - this is the basic problem of causal interaction. Counterargument 2. Argument from brain damage This argument has been formulated by Paul Churchland, among others. The point is simply that when the brain undergoes some kind of damage (caused by automobile accidents, drug abuse or pathological diseases), it is always the case that the mental substance and/or properties of the person are significantly compromised. If the mind
were a completely separate substance from the brain, how could it be possible that every single time the brain is injured, the mind is also injured? Indeed, it is very frequently the case that one can even predict and explain the kind of mental or psychological deterioration or change that human beings will undergo when specific parts of their brains are damaged. So the question for the dualist to try to confront is how can all of this be explained if the mind is a separate and immaterial substance from, or if its properties are ontologically independent of, the brain. Counterargument 3. Argument from biological development. Another common argument against dualism consists in the idea that since human beings (both phylogenetically and ontogenetically) begin their existence
as entirely physical or material entities and since nothing outside of the domain of the physical is added later on in the course of development, then we must necessarily end up being fully developed material beings. Phylogenetically, the human species evolved, as did all other species, from a single cell made up of matter. Since all the events that later occurred which ended up in the formation of our species can be explained through the processes of random mutation and natural selection, the difficulty for the dualist is to explain where and why there could have intervened some non-material, non-physical event in this process of natural evolution. Ontogenetically, we begin life as a simple fertilized ovum. There is nothing non-material or mentalistic involved in conception, the formation of the blastula, the gastrula, and so on. Our development can be explained entirely in terms of the accumulation of matter through the processes of nutrition. The postulation of a non-physical mind would seem superfluous.
Counterargument 4. Argument from simplicity The argument from simplicity is probably the simplest and also the most common form of argument against dualism of the mental. The dualist is always faced with the question of why anyone should find it necessary to believe in the existence of two, ontologically distinct, entities (mind and brain), when it seems possible and would make for a simpler thesis to test against scientific evidence, to explain the same events and properties in terms of one. It is a heuristic principle in science and philosophy not to assume the existence of more entities than is necessary for clear explanation and prediction (see Occam's razor). This argument was criticized by Peter Glassen in a debate with
J. J. C. Smart in the pages of Philosophy in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Glassen argued that, because it is not a physical entity, Occam's Razor cannot consistently be appealed to by a physicalist or materialist as a justification of mental states or events, such as the belief that dualism is false. Counterargument 5. Argument from unlikeness of being Immaterial Minds in Space. There is the question of where in space to put minds. Is there a principled and motivated way of assigning a location to each soul? We might suggest that I locate my soul in my body, you locate your soul in your body, and so on. That may sound like a
natural and reasonable suggestion, but it faces a number of difficulties: 1.First, what about disembodied souls, souls that are not united with a body, and so on. 2. Second, if your soul is located in your body, exactly where in your body is it located? PROPERTY DUALISM description Property dualism describes a category of positions in the PM which hold that, although the world is constituted of just one kind of substance - the physical kind - there exist two distinct kinds of
properties: physical properties and mental properties. In other words, it is the view that nonphysical, mental properties (such as beliefs, desires and emotions) inhere in some physical substances (namely brains). PROPERTY DUALISM scheme PROPERTY DUALISM explanation 1. Property is used in a broad sense: Mental
properties comprise mental functions, capacities, events, states, and the like, and similarly for physical properties. It is a catchall term referring to events, activities, states, and the rest. So property dualism is the claim that mental properties are diverse from and irreducible to physical properties. PROPERTY DUALISM explanation 2.
Property dualism is a compromise position between substance dualism and materialism. Like materialism, it holds that there is only one type of substance: physical. Property dualism denies the existence of immaterial minds that somehow interact with the physical world, animating unconscious bodies. Where property dualism parts with materialism is that it does not attempt to reduce mental states to physical states. Mental
states, according to the property dualist, are irreducible; there is no purely physical analysis of mind. Property dualism thus holds that although there is only one type of substance physical, there are two types of property - physical and non-physical. Our bodies have physical properties such weight and height, and mental properties such as beliefs and desires. COUNTERARGUMENT 1. By Property Dualism the brain owns two types of properties: physical and mental. Therefore all conscious experiences are properties of the underlying substance which manifests itself physically as the brain. It
seems as a logical mistake (of classification), namely Mental and Physical are parts of Physical COUNTERARGUMENT 2. In this line of thinking consciousness is itself a property. It leads to absurd inferences, namely if this is true then I (and you) am (are) a property(ies). This is the main argument against Property Dualism: the conscious self is an entity, not a property, and mental states are various aspects, or states, of that entity. The entire argument is based on the intuitive falsity of this assertion which follows from Property Dualism, "I am a
property." COUNTERARGUMENT 3. Properties must by definition inhere in something, and in fact, it is impossible to imagine a property as separate from an entity in which it might inhere. It is for example, impossible to imagine the colour red as divorced from the surface of which it is a property. It is impossible to imagine the property "four-sided" as separate from some shape. Consciousness, however, can easily be imagined as divorced from what it is purportedly a property of. To put it another way, I can easily imagine myself, that is my conscious self, I, me, as separate from and unrelated to that physical substance which my brain is the physical manifestation of. In fact, I can conceive
of my conscious self as inhering in nothing at all, i.e. not being a property. Therefore, consciousness and the mental states attendant upon it are not properties. TENDENCY the fact is that substance dualism has played a very small role in contemporary discussions in philosophy of mind. Dualism is no longer a dualism of two sorts of substances; it is now a dualism of two sorts
of properties, mental and physical (Jaegwon Kim, Philosophy of Mind). Identity theories This kind of theories intend to demonstrate that mental states, which are not observable, can be reduced to something which is observable. This strategy is a strategy of reductionism. It tries to keep us within only one reality and remove mind-body problem. Two types of Identity Theories
Behaviourism Mental life and Behaviour are the same. Identity Theory (or Physicalism) Mental life and Brain processes are the same. BEHAVIORISM (1890-1960) Behaviorism arose early in the twentieth century as a doctrine on the nature and
methodology of psychology, in reaction to what some psychologists took to be the subjective and unscientific character of introspectionist psychology. Compare W.James: Psychology is the Science of Mental Life of its phenomena and of their conditions. The phenomena are such things as we call feelings, desires, cognitions, reasonings, decisions, and the like. J. Watson: Psychology is a purely objective experimental branch of nature science. Its the goal
is the prediction and control of behavior. What is Behaviour? We may take behavior to mean whatever people or organisms, or even mechanical systems, do that is publicly observable. Four possible types of Behavior:
Physiological reactions and responses: for example, perspiration, salivation, increase in the pulse rate, increase in blood pressure. Bodily movements: for example, raising and waving a hand, opening a door, throwing a baseball, a cat scratching at the door, a rat turning left in a T-maze. Actions involving bodily motions: for example, typing an invitation, greeting a friend, checking a book out of the library, going shopping, writing a check, signing a contract. Actions not involving overt bodily motions: for example, reasoning, guessing, calculating, judging, deciding. The main point of Behaviourism
Behaviour is taken to be bodily events and conditions that are publicly observable and that do not give rise to the kind of first-person epistemic asymmetry for supposedly private mental phenomena. Types of Behaviourism Ontological Behaviourism mind is a behaviour itself (Watson); Scientific (Psychological) Behaviourism mind is the operational process input
(stimulus)-black box-output (respond) (Skinner); Logical Behaviourism mind is the outer meaning (Wittgenstein, Ryle). Logical Behaviourism Logical Behaviorism I. Any meaningful psychological statement, that is, a statement purportedly describing a mental phenomenon, can be translated, without loss of content, into a
statement solely about behavioral and physical phenomena. Logical Behaviorism II. Every meaningful psychological expression can be defined solely in terms of behavioral and physical expressions, that is, those referring to behavioral and physical phenomena. The general idea: if some mental states are meaningful it means they have some outer verifications, otherwise they are meaningless and there is no a reason to investigate them. Hempels Argument
The content, or meaning, of any meaningful statement is exhausted by the conditions that must be verified to obtain if we are to consider that statement true (we may call them verification conditions); If statement is not have an intersubjective content - that is, a meaning that can be shared by different persons its verification conditions must be publicly observable; Only behavioral and physical phenomena are publicly observable;
Therefore, the content of any meaningful psychological statement must be specifiable by statement of publicly observable verification conditions, that is, statements describing appropriate behavioral and physical conditions that must hold if and only if the psychological statement is to count as true. Example of behavioural translation 1. Masha is in love for introspectionist means: Masha is in a specific, closed for outer observation, mental state, which she describes as I am in love.
2. Masha is in love for behaviourist means: Masha is smiling and sighing; At the question: Whats the matter she answers: I am in love; Closer examination reveals that she has high degree of palpitation and blood pressure; Her central nervous system shows such and such changes. Difficulties of behavioural translation 1. How its possible to translate the following Mashas belief:
Something tells me that the idea of behavioural translation is wrong. In this case we cant see any specific behaviour instantiations. It is much more difficult to associate higher states with specific patterns of behaviour. 2. Complex of mental states; and so on N. Chomskys objection (which destroyed behaviourism) The argument itself was concerned about Language (for behaviourists language was a response to stimulus.
The meaningfulness of the mental state is the other mental state or the mental state of the other person. Example: I`m reading a lecture. It displays as a sort of behaviour (which is outer), but the meaning of that lecture itself refers to your and also my comprehension, which is inner. The Psychoneural Identity Theory (1950-1960) H. Feigl, J. Smart, W. Place This position advocates the identification of mental states and events with the physical processes in the brain. The identity theory states that mental events are identical
with brain processes. Sometimes such expressions as state, phenomenon, and occurrence are used interchangeably with event and process. As a specific example of psychoneutral identity, let us again consider the statement pains are C-fiber excitations. This is something glossed as follows: For a person (organism) to be in pain is for him to be in the C-fiber excitation state. Mind-Body Supervenience Mind-Body Supervenience 1. The mental supervenes on the physical in that things (objects, events, organisms, persons,
and so on) that are exactly alike in all physical properties cannot differ with respect to mental properties. That is, physical indiscernibility entails psychological indiscenibility. OR: No mental difference without a physical difference. Mind-Body Supervenience 2. The mental supervenes on the physical just in case if anything X has a mental property M, there is a physical property P such that X has P, and necessarily any object that has P has M. OR: If things are alike in psychological respects doesnt mean that they are alike in physical respects. Some inferences from Supervenience
If we have two physically identical creatures it means that they are also identical in terms of mentality. Category Mistake (or Ghost in Machine) of G. Ryle The Prime Minister is in London, and the Foreign Secretary is in Paris, and the Home Secretary is in Bristol, but where is the Government? The Government is not another person (essence) alongside its members. Ryle used the notion primarily to claim that mind and
body cannot be spoken of in parallel ways, but are in different 'categories'. Nomological dangler of H. Feigl 1. 2. Pain occurs iff C-fiber stimulation (Cfs) occurs; Pain = Cfs. Pain and Cfs are one and not two, and we are not faced by two distinct phenomena whose correlation needs to be explained. In this way, psychoneural identities permit us to transcend and eliminate
psychoneural correlations laws, which are nomological danglers. Two examples: Clark Kent is a Superman. Morning Venus). Star is Evening Star (planet
Simplicity of J. Smart The following two formulations are among the standard ways of understanding this principle (Ockhams razor): 1. Entities must not be multiplied beyond necessity. 2. What can be done with fewer assumptions should not be done with more. Modern Proponents of Identity Theory: Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker If we believe that heat is correlated with but nit identical to molecular kinetic energy, we
should regard as legitimate the question why the correlation exists and what its mechanism is. But once we realize that heat is molecular kinetic energy, questions like this will be seen as wrongheaded. (N. Block and R. Stalnaker Conceptual Analisis, Dualism, and the Eplanatory Gap). Other examples: Water is H20; Heat is a molecular kinetic energy;
Light is electromagnetic radiation. This chair is a cloud of particles. Two versions of Explanatory Argument for Psychoneural Identity The two explanatory arguments differ on the question of what it is that is supposed to be explained by psychoneural identities that is, on the questions of the explanandum. Explanatory argument 1 takes the explanandum to be psychoneural correlations, claiming that psychoneural identities give the best explanation of psychoneural correlations. Explanatory argument 2 argues that the identities rather than
explaining the correlations, explain facts about mental phenomena that would otherwise remain unexplained. Explanatory Argument 1. Someone might be curious why Clark Kent turns up whenever and wherever Superman turns up?? The best, or the simpler, explanation will be: Because Clark Kent is a Superman. Pain occurs iff Cfs occurs Therefore Pain = Cfs Where Cfs is a C-fiber stimulation Explanatory Argument 2.
Cfs causes neural stat N (C1) Pain occurs iff Cfs occurs. (C2) Distress occurs iff neural state N occurs. Therefore pain correlates with a phenomenon that causes a phenomenon with which distress correlates. Objections to the Psychoneural Identity Theory The
Epistemological Arguments; The Modal Argument; The Multiple Realization Argument. The Epistemological Objection 1. The Epistemological Objection 1. This objection assumes that the two statements S knows something about X and X=Y together entail S knows something about Y. But is this true? For example, medieval people knew what is water,
but they didnt know what is H20 (they knew about pain, but didnt know anything about C-fibers). The Epistemological Objection 2. Our knowledge is not based on evidence or inference; somehow we directly know. In contrast we have no such privileged access to our brain states. Neurologist probably have much better knowledge in our brain than we do. Mental states are directly accessible, brain states are not. So how can mental states
be brain states? The Epistemological Objection 3. According to the identity theory, specific psychoneural identities are empirical truths discovered through scientific observation and theoretical research. If X=Y is an empirical truth, the two names or descriptions, X and Y, must have independent criteria of application. Otherwise, the identity would be a priori knowable, for example, identities like bachelor = unmarried man. But in the case the husband of Xanthippe = Xanthippes male spouse we know that they are identical not only logical, but also empirical (by knowing about Socrates).
In that turn I in the case mourning star is an evening star we know that they are identical only because of reference to the object (Venus). Therefore its presupposed that in case of identity pain is C-fiber excitation they both independently refer to some object, which is nor physical nor mental. What it could be? The Modal Argument (by S. Kripke) We have two types of identities: Contingent Identity one term is rigid designator (name) and another is nonrigid designator (description). Necessary Identity both of terms are rigid designators names or natural terms. Pain is C-fibers stimulation consists on rigid designators (they
are natural terms). Therefore this identity must be necessary, which means that it is impossible to conceive one without other pain without brain reactions. But we can easily conceive pain without brain stimulation and vise versa. So mind-body identity is false. The Multiple Realization Argument (H. Putnam) How we can be sure that all pain-capable organisms have C-fibers.
Argument from verification (V.Vasilyev) Its impossible to verify that mental state is the same that brain state, because we dont have here such empirical third object as Venus in the case of Morning and Evening Star. ELIMINIATIVISM (P. Churchland) Mind or mental states are the extra linguistic essences which have to be eliminate from the scientific dictionary as a Folk Psychology term.
FUNCTIONALISM What makes something a tea-kettle or a vending machine is its ability to perform a certain function, not any specific physicochemical structure or mechanism. Many concepts seem to be functional concepts (for example, catalyst, gene, heart) appear to have an essentially functional component. Mind as Computing Machine According to Functionalism it is possible to
say that there is nothing more except functional work in the mind. Therefore, Mind is the Function. The multiple realizability of mental properties. If mind is a function it can be realized in the different devices. It has only one requirement it must be embodied, but bodies could be different. Realizers of Functional Properties X is a tea-kettle = X has some property F that F
enables X to keep and boil water. X is the mind = X has some property F that enables X to The causal work could be done in many different ways. This means that there are many in fact, indefinitely many realizers of the property of being a tea-kettle (being the mind). Functionalism is an basic idea of Artificial Intelligence. If Mind it the pure Function it is plausible to model it on the computer (realize as a program).
Putnums famous thought experiment: Brain as a Computer Functionalism acknowledges that having a brain of a certain structural complexity is important to mentality, but the importance of the brain lies exactly in its being a physical machine. It is our brain, computational powers, not its Biological properties, that constitute our mentality. In short, our brain is our mind because it is a computing machine, not because it is composed of the kind of protein based biological stuff it is composed of.
Functionalism and Behaviourism (Similarity). Both functionalism and behaviorism speak of sensory input and behavioral output or stimulus and response - at central to the concepts of mentality. In this respect, functionalism is part of a broadly behavioral approach to mentality and can be considered a generalized and more sophisticated version of behaviorism. But there is also a significant difference between them. Functionalism and Behaviourism
(Difference). Functionalist is espousing mental realism a position that considers mental states as having a genuine ontological status and counts them among the phenomena of the world with a place in its causal structure. For Behaviourist mental states are real too, but only as behaviours; for him there is nothing mental over and above actual an possible behaviour. For the Functionalist, mental states are inner causes of behaviour, and as such they are over and above behaviour.
Turing Test (A. Turing) The Turing test is a test of a machines ability to demonstrate intelligence. A human judge engages in a natural language conversation with one human and one machine, each of which tries to appear human. All participants are separated from one another. If the judge cannot reliably tell the machine from the human, the machine is said to have passed the test. In order to test the machine's intelligence rather than its ability to render words into audio, the conversation is limited to a text-only channel such as a computer keyboard and screen.
Examples: Judge: Do you think that American soldiers should go to Bosnia? Therapist: I think that what Clinton has done in sending 20,000 peacekeepers to Bosnia will ensure a lasting peace. Judge: Do you think most Americans feel the way you do? Therapist: What did you mean when you said do you think that American soldiers should go to Bosnia? Did anyone ever tell you that you think too much? Oh, I think most Americans feel the way I do? Judge: I think. I do research. I write. I love. I live. SEPO: I wonder whether you think sometimes! I am feeling
like the judge here! Turing thesis If two systems are input-output equivalent, they have the same psychological status; in particular one is mental just in case the other is. Counterarguments Chinese Room (J. Searle) Syntatic engine Vs. Semantic engine and Strong AI Vs. Weak AI
The mind is a semantic engine; the computer, in contrast, is only a syntactic engine. Syntatic process is a weak AI Semantic process is a strong AI Searls deduction Mentality can arise only in complex biological systems, like the human brain. It seems that the same neurobiological causal processes will go on matter what the neural states involved represent about the world or whether they represent anything at all. Neural processes seem no
more responsive no meaning and representational content than are computational processes. Local physical biological conditions in the brain, not the distal states of affairs represented by them, are what drive neural processes. One more thought experiment Imagine that we read two novels. Novel 1: Scene one: a bloody murder has occurred; Scene two: Two lovers finally have met each other; Scene three: A big robbery has happened in the museum; Scene four: Group of terrorists hijack a plain;
Scene five: In the middle of the city people found huge casket with treasures. Do the machine notice that something wrong with novel?? Novel 2: Scene one: Mr. Smith has fallen in love Scene two: Mr. Smith has been attacked with gangsters; Scene three: Mr. Smith has learned about theft which happened in the museum; Scene four: Mr. Smith has met an old friend of him; Scene five: Mr. Smith visits a psychotherapist. Do the machine notice that something wrong with the novel at this time?? Reductive and non-reductive physicalism. Reductive versions of Mind-Body problem:
1. Elimanativism; 2. Identity theory (Token or Type); 3. Functionalism. Three models of reduction 1. 2. 3. Bridge-Law reduction (E. Nagel) the reduction of a higher-level theory to a more fundamental theory. For example, the
reduction of optics to electromagnetic theory or genetics to molecular biology. Identity Reduction; Functional Reduction. Non-reductive Physicalism (Emergentism) Doctrine of Property Emergence. When aggregates of material particles attain an appropriate level of structural complexity, genuine novel properties emerge. Irreducibility of Emergent Properties. Emergent properties are not reducible to their basal conditions the underlying conditions from which they emerge.
Doctrine of Downward Causation. Emergent properties have causal powers to influence phenomena at the level from which they have emerged. Other types of monism Type and Token physicalism; Neutral Monism (B.Russel); Anomalous Monism (D. Davidson). Token and Type Physicalism
Token Physicalism. Every event that falls under a mental event kind also falls under a physical event kind (or every event that has a mental property has also some physical property); Type Physicalism. Mental kinds are physical kinds; alternatively, mental properties are physical properties. Its easier to make descriptions among token physicalism and harder among type.
Neutral Monism (B. Russel) There are only ONE substance of the World Event, which has space and time coordinates. These events could be described by using mentalist language (description) or physicalist language (description). Despite these two descriptions in fact there is only kind reality, which is neutral and neither physical neither mental. Anomalous Monism (D. Davidson) According to Davidson there are 4 possible theories:
Nomological Monism (Materialism); Nomological Dualism (Pre-Establishd Harmony, Theory of Translation); Anomalous Dualism (Cartesian Dualism); Anomalous Monism (Davidsons version). Davidsons scheme
Nomological Monism (Classical Materialism) - each mental event is a physical event and therefore it is possible to predict mental state due to psychophysical laws; Nomological Dualism - mental events are independent from physical, but still are able to be predicted due to physical states which strictly corresponds to mental; Anomalous Dualism mental events are independent from physical, therefore its impossible to make any predictions about mental events; Anomalous Monism each mental event is a physical, BUT its impossible to make any predictions about mental events.
Therefore its called Anomalous Monism. NON-REDUCTIONISM Mind is not Consciousness; There is something more (over and above) physical events in the brain; It could be very plausible that human mind has natural limitations to succeed in mindbody problem (R. Penrouse, C. McGinn, S. Pinker, N. Chomsky). Phenomenal Consciousness: Qualia When you look at a ripe tomato, you sense its color in a certain way, a way that
is different from the way you sense the color of a mound of lettuce leaves. If you crush the tomato and bring it close to your nose, it smells in a distinctive way that is different from the way a crushed lemon smells. Across sense modalities, smelling gasoline is very different from tasting it. Sensory mental events and states, like seeing a ripe red tomato, smelling gasoline, experiencing a shooting pain, up and down your leg, and the like, have distinctive qualitative characters, that is, felt or sensed qualities, by means of which they are identified as sensations of a certain type. 1. Qualia are the way things seem, look, or appear to a conscious creature; 2. If a perceptual experience represents an object to be F and if this experience is true, than the object is F. Epistemic Subjectivity: Privacy and
Special Epistemic Access. Subjectivity is often claimed to be of the essence of consciousness. However, subjectivity has no fixed, unambiguous meaning. One sense of subjectivity is epistemological, having to do with the supposed special nature of knowledge of conscious states. The main idea is that a subject has a special epistemic access to her own current conscious states; we seem to be immediately aware, as Descartes said, of our own feelings, thoughts, and perceptions and enjoy a special sort of first person authority with regard to them.
Perspectival Subjectivity: The First Person Point of View or what-is-likeness (T. Nagel). Some philosophers have closely associated subjectivity of Consciousness with the notion of a first person point of view, or perspective. There is no impersonal what is like to be; it is always what is like for a given subject (for you, for me, for humans, for bats strictly speaking only for me) to see yellow, to taste pineapple, to echolocate a bat in flight.
Explanatory Gap (J. Levine) It is the claim that consciousness and human experiences such as qualia cannot be fully explained only by physical mechanical processes. Proponents of this view claim that the mind is substantially and qualitatively different from the brain and that the existence of something metaphysically extra-physical is required to 'fill the gap.' In the end, we are right back where we started. The explanatory gap argument doesn't demonstrate a gap in nature, but a gap in our understanding of nature. Of course a plausible explanation for there being a gap in our understanding of nature is that there is a genuine gap in nature. But so long as we have countervailing reasons for doubting the latter, we have to look elsewhere for an explanation of the
former. (Levine, J. Conceivability, Identity, and the Explanatory Gap) Hard Problem How could a physical system be the sort of thing that could learn, or that could remember (D. Chalmers) EASY PROBLEM How
could a physical system be the sort of thing that could experience pain? (D. Chalmers) HARD PROBLEM Zombie argument (D. Chalmers) A zombie is a hypothetical being that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except that it lacks consciousness, qualia, or sentience . Since a zombie is indistinguishable from human beings physiologically and contains all processes that are required to maintain a human being; its hypothetical possibility is an argument for the presence of advanced human consciousness which is more than the sum of human neurological pathways and brain state.
For example, when you pick zombie with the needle ha says Oh, but in fact he doesnt feel any pain. The sum of physical facts do not give us the Qualia-experience Or Physicalists description of the human being give us the description of Zobmie. Objection to the Zombie Argument (D. Dennett) One of the arguments against the zombie argument is the idea of verificationism sentience. Verificationism states that for words to have meaning their use must be open to public verification. Using the definition of zombie states that the presence of qualia cannot be verified by
others. Since it is assumed that we can talk about our qualia, the existence of zombies are impossible. when philosophers claim that zombies are conceivable, they invariably underestimate the task of conception, and end up imagining something that violates their own definition (Dennett, D., Consciousness Explained). Sceptical points of view C. McGinn; R. Penrouse; S. Pinker;
N. Chomsky Colin McGinn and Cognitive Closure We have problems and mysteries. Mindbody problem is not a problem, its a mystery. The operations the human mind can carry out are incapable in principle of taking us to a proper appreciation of what consciousness is and how it works. Mind-body problem doesnt have any appropriate solution for human beings.
R. Penrouse and Theory of Incomplicity According to Penrose the (computational) brain itself cannot be the basis for what we think of as our minds. This is not to say that there is nothing about our brains that is computational or combinatorial. It is rather to say that the computational account of mind is incomplete and, will always be so. S. Pinker and Modules We do not have the Meta-Modules to
completely explain how brain works. N. Chomsky The human mind is a biologically given system with certain powers and limits . . . The fact that admissible hypotheses are available to this specific biological system accounts for its ability to construct rich and complex explanatory theories. But the same properties of mind that provide admissible hypotheses may well exclude other successful theories as unintelligible to humans. Some theories might simply not be among the admissible hypotheses determined by the specific properties of mind that adapt us to imagining correct theories of some kinds, though these theories might be accessible to a differently organized intelligence. The naturalistic temper . . . takes for granted that humans are part of the natural world, not angels, and will therefore have capacities with specific scope and limits, determined by
their special structure. For a rat, some questions are problems that it can solve, others are mysteries that lie beyond its cognitive reach; the same should be true of humans, and to first approximation, that seems a fair conclusion. What we call natural science is a kind of chance convergence between aspects of the world and properties of the human mind/brain, which has allowed some rays of light to penetrate the general obscurity, excluding, it seems, central domains of the mental. (Chomsky, N. 1975: Reflections on Language).